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Congressional Perspective on the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985
The Honorable Mike Synart
with Vincent LoVoitt &
Donald R. C. Pongracettt
Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Def-
icit Control Act (the "Act"),' popularly known as "Gramm-Rud-
man, ' 2 as a response to towering federal budget deficits.3 As en-
acted, the Gramm-Rudman legislation would have reduced
annual federal budget deficits by establishing maximum limits
on the size of the budget deficit for each of the succeeding five
fiscal years, ending with a balanced budget in fiscal year 1991.,
The legislation authorized the General Accounting Office (GAO)
to estimate the projected deficit for the upcoming fiscal year,
basing its determination on similar estimates by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO).5 If the GAO's estimated deficit exceeded the maxi-
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1. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985).
2. The legislation is named after two of its primary sponsors in the Senate: Sen. Phil
Gramm (R-Tex.) and Sen. Warren Rudman (R-N.H.). Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
also sponsored the legislation.
3. See generally Working Toward a Balanced Budget: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on the Budget, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (describing magnitude of federal defi-
cit crisis).
4. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, § 201(a), 99 Stat. 1037, 1039 (1985).
5. See id. § 251, 99 Stat. 1037, 1063 (1985).
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mum permissible level, Gramm-Rudman required the President
to make proportional reductions in spending for certain catego-
ries of federal programs.6
Gramm-Rudman was a highly controversial piece of legisla-
tion, which elicited criticism from Members of both Houses of
Congress, the press, legal scholars, and the public.7 Many indi-
viduals voiced their concerns about which federal programs
ought to be subject to the automatic cuts that Gramm-Rudman
envisioned.8 Defense spending, public assistance, health care,
and education all had champions fighting to protect them from
Gramm-Rudman's automatic cuts." Few individuals, however,
raised the concern that Gramm-Rudman was fundamentally
flawed in that it improperly delegated congressional spending
power to the executive branch and thus was unconstitutional.
This flaw, however, was apparent to certain Members of
Congress, members of the press and others who believed that
6. See id. § 252, 99 Stat. 1037, 1072 (1985). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct.
3181 (1986). The Court described the Gramm-Rudman budget cutting mechanism as
follows:
If in any fiscal year the budget deficit exceeds the prescribed maximum by more
than a specified sum, the Act requires basically across-the-board cuts in Federal
spending to reach the targeted deficit level. These reductions are accomplished
under the "reporting provisions" spelled out in § 251 of the Act, which requires
the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) to submit their deficit estimates and program by pro-
gram budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General who, after review-
ing the Directors' joint report, then reports his conclusions to the President. The
President in turn must issue a "sequestration" order mandating the spending re-
ductions specified by the Comptroller General, and the sequestration order be-
comes effective unless, within a specified time, Congress legislates reductions to
obviate the need for the sequestration order.
Id. at 3182.
7. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. H11891-2 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985) (remarks of Rep.
LaFalce) (not delivered); id. at S17441 (remarks of Sen. Byrd).
8. See, e.g., Letter from E. Phillip Riggin, Director, National Legislative Commis-
sion for the American Legion to U.S. Representatives (Oct. 25, 1985); Letter from Ray
Denison, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO to U.S. Representatives (Oct.
21, 1985); Letter from Coalition on Block Grants and Human Needs (Jan. 1985); Letter
from Lutheran Church of America to U.S. Members of Congress (Oct. 18, 1985); Letter
from Consortium for Citizens with Developmental Disabilities (Oct. 18, 1985).
9. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. H11889 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985) (remarks of Rep. Hart-
nett); Letter from American Public Welfare Assoc. to Rep. Michael Synar (Oct. 17,
1985); Letter from Charles L. Massey, President of March of Dimes to Conferees (Oct.
22, 1985); Letter from American Council on Education to the Honorable Michael L.
Synar (Oct. 18, 1985).
[Vol. 7:675
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/6
CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Gramm-Rudman unconstitutionally changed the basic structure
of our government. My initial analysis of the bill persuaded me
that, if enacted, it would unconstitutionally delegate the con-
gressional spending power to members of the executive branch,
thereby violating the doctrine of delegation. In addition, the Act
required legislative officers to perform executive functions, thus
violating the doctrine of separation of powers. Consequently, in
the conference between the House and Senate on the measure,10
I insisted on the inclusion of a provision that authorized prompt
judicial review of the bill's constitutionality.
On December 12, 1985, two hours after President Reagan
signed the bill into law, I filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the Act's consti-
tutionality on numerous grounds." On February 7, 1986, a spe-
cial three-judge panel found the Act to be unconstitutional on
the ground that it violated the principle of separation of pow-
ers." The district court panel rejected the broader argument
that the Gramm-Rudman provision establishing automatic
spending cuts was an unconstitutional delegation of a "core
function" of the legislative branch and could not be delegated to
another branch of government.1 3 On July 7, 1986, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the district court's judgment on
the same narrow ground."
Part I of this Commentary provides some perspective on the
initial congressional consideration of Gramm-Rudman. Inas-
much as Gramm-Rudman remains the primary method by which
Congress is addressing the problem of federal budget deficits,
such insight should be helpful in illuminating the advantages
and disadvantages of this budget-cutting mechanism. Part II ex-
amines the subsequent judicial consideration of the constitution-
10. Conferences are usually requested when differing versions of legislation are ap-
proved by the two houses. See JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § XLVI
(1801), reprinted in L. DESCHLER, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-FIRST CONGRESS, H.R. Doc.
No. 629, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 227-38 (1929). They may, however, be requested in any
case of difference of opinion on matters pending between them. Id.
11. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374
(D.D.C.) (No. 85-3945), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
12. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1382-91.
13. Id. at 1385.
14. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3194 (1986).
1987]
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ality of Gramm-Rudman. Reviewing the opinions of the district
court and United States Supreme Court, this section focuses on
what I believe was the mistakenly narrow ground for the Court's
declaration of the Act's unconstitutionality. The final section ad-
dresses some of the implications that the Court's narrow deci-
sion may have on the future of the federal budget process.
I. Congressional Consideration of Gramm-Rudman
Proponents of the Gramm-Rudman legislation first intro-
duced the measure in the closing days of the First Session of the
99th Congress. 15 They offered it on the Senate floor as an
amendment to a measure, already passed by the House, which
would raise the federal statutory debt ceiling - a "must-pass"
bill.16 Due to the expedited manner in which Gramm-Rudman
was offered, there were no hearings nor any committee action on
the measure prior to its consideration by the full Senate.1"
After extensive negotiations between opponents and propo-
nents of the debt-ceiling increase measure,' 8 the Senate ap-
proved the Gramm-Rudman amendment on October 10, 1985.19
Because the Senate measure was an amendment to a previously
passed House bill, following Senate passage, the House re-
quested a House-Senate conference committee.2 0 The House ap-
pointed conferees on Friday, October 11, 1985,21 and the Senate
appointed conferees the following Tuesday.2 2
The House of Representatives selected conferees from five
15. 131 CONG. REC. S12561 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1985). Proponents offered Gramm-Rud-
man as a Senate floor amendment to H.R.J. Res. 372. Id. House of Representatives
Joint Resolution 372 proposed raising the public debt ceiling to $2,078,700,000,000.
H.R.J. Res. 372, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
16. Wehr, Fight Brewing in Senate Over Debt-Limit Hike, 43 CONG. Q. 1787 (1985)
(explaining necessity of congressional action on federal debt limit prior to Oct. 8, 1985).
17. The usual process for Senate consideration of a measure is for a bill, upon intro-
duction, to be referred to the committee of competent jurisdiction. It is then referred to
the relevant subcommittee which holds hearings on the measure. The subcommittee then
reports the bill to the full committee, which may then hold hearings of its own. The full
committee then reports the bill. It is then brought to the Senate floor for full Senate
consideration. See F. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURES, PRECEDENTS & PRACTICES (1981).
18. See Wehr, supra, note 16, at 1787.
19. 131 CONG. REC. S13114 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1985).
20. Id.
21. 131 CONG. REC. H8716-34 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1985).
22. 131 CONG. REC. §13277 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1985).
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different House committees, as well as "at-large" conferees rep-
resenting the leadership of the two parties.2 3 I was made a mem-
ber of the conference committee because I sat on the House
Committee on Government Operations which has jurisdiction
over the Budget Act. Because I also sat on the House Committee
on the Judiciary, I decided to focus on the legislation's constitu-
tional problems. Significant as these constitutional problems
may have been, they were not the overriding concern of many
Members of Congress to whom Gramm-Rudman represented an
efficient means of attacking the budget deficit.
Barraged by a growing call from the electorate for deficit
reduction and frustrated by Congress' continued inability to
meet the call, most Members either supported Gramm-Rudman
outright or felt Congress had to respond dramatically in some
fashion to the budget deficits. The Members were clear: unless
an acceptable alternative were offered, they would support
Gramm-Rudman. In searching for such an alternative, the
House Democratic leadership realized that the automatic budget
cuts proposed in Gramm-Rudman were a political sine qua non
for many Members.2 At the same time, according to many con-
stitutional analyses, the automatic cuts made Gramm-Rudman
unconstitutional. 25 To my mind, therefore, the constitutional is-
sues were the crux of the budget impasse and a test of the bill's
constitutionality was essential.
On Friday, October 17, 1985, after a week of hurried analy-
sis and internal debate among Members of both Houses, the full
conference committee met. To help focus the conferees' atten-
tion on the constitutional issues, I asked Professor Laurence
Tribe of Harvard Law School, to analyze these issues and I dis-
tributed his findings in which he echoed our earlier analysis with
regard to the potential constitutional problems in the initial
draft of Gramm-Rudman.2 He identified as one of the more sig-
23. 131 CONG. REC. H8733-34 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1985).
24. See generally 131 CONG. REC. H8716-34 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1985).
25. See Statements Presented at the Hearing on "the Balanced Budget and Emer-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985" Before the Legislation and National Security Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-38
(1985) (statement of Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress).
26. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to the Honorable Mike Synar (Oct. 22, 1985)
[hereinafter Letter from Laurence H. Tribe]. During the first day of the Gramm-Rud-
1987]
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nificant problems the trigger mechanism for Gramm-Rudman's
automatic budget cuts, which he found "almost certainly to be
unconstitutional" on separation of powers grounds."' He ex-
plained the constitutional difficulties of the Gramm-Rudman
trigger as follows:
Giving such executive duties to a legislative officer is almost
certainly unconstitutional. The Supreme Court unanimously
ruled nearly a decade ago that, although Congress may designate
its own agents to assist in the investigative tasks that support the
lawmaking function, no-one who exercises power as an officer of
the United States may be appointed by the legislative branch.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). For the Court,
the Constitution's appointments clause is no mere matter of "eti-
quette or protocol," but a vital structural check upon the power
of Congress. Id. at 125.28
At the time of his analysis, the trigger mechanism in the
Senate-passed measure consisted of budget-deficit estimates
only from OMB and CBO.2 9 In this original Senate-passed ver-
sion, no role was assigned to the GAO in the deficit-cutting pro-
cess.30 The GAO's role was first introduced after the conference
broke down."1
man conference, I asked the Chairman whether or not the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion had been reviewed by congressional committee staff, the Department of Justice, or
any congressional support group, and, deferring to Steve Bell, the Senate Budget Com-
mittee staff director, he responded "no." We then asked for a Congressional Research
Service (CRS) analysis of Gramm-Rudman vis-a-vis article I, sections 7 and 8.
We were not sure, however, that the CRS memorandum would be finished in time to
be of use during our deliberations on Gramm-Rudman. Consequently, we sought some
sort of analysis which could quickly bring attention to the constitutional problems as the
legislation was rushed through the Congress. Having discussed the issue with Professor
Tribe over the past few days, we asked him for a letter pointing out some of Gramm-
Rudman's constitutional problems. We sent the draft legislation to Professor Tribe by
overnight mail and he prepared his analysis by the next day.
We circulated copies of his letter at the next meeting of the conference committee.
The reaction to the letter was remarkable in that no member seemed to care. The Senate
members' attitude seemed to be that Gramm-Rudman was inevitable and constitutional
questions were merely last ditch efforts to stop it. The House members believed some-
thing stronger politically was necessary to stop the legislation.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 131 CONG. REC. S12564 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1985).
30. Id.
31. Id. at H9838, S14908.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/6
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Although Congress was continually pressured by time con-
straints for enactment of legislation extending the federal statu-
tory debt ceiling on which Gramm-Rudman was appended, the
Department of Treasury consistently "found" sufficient funds to
continue operating, giving Congress more time to resolve the
Gramm-Rudman crisis.32 Having additional time and recogniz-
ing the constitutional problems posed by the original Gramm-
Rudman provisions, the House conferees decided to subdivide
into smaller, informal task forces to study various aspects of the
legislation and report back with recommendations on how best
to resolve the problems posed. 3
During the few days given us to develop possible solutions
to Gramm-Rudman's constitutional problems, our discussions
made clear that the automatic budget cuts were the central is-
sue. 4 Consequently, we focused our efforts on a means of incor-
porating a mechanism that would provide for such automatic
cuts, while at the same time, avoid the constitutional infirmities
of the original proposal.
As a compromise, the chairman of the task force on consti-
tutional issues proposed a more logical budget process which re-
sembled Gramm-Rudman, but which required an affirmative
vote by the Congress before automatic cuts could go into effect. 6
In the event that the conference did not adopt the proposal, I
suggested that we include a provision allowing for expedited ju-
dicial review of Gramm-Rudman's constitutionality.3 I also pro-
32. See Letter from James Baker to Rep. Mike Synar (Oct. 22, 1985); see also Wehr
supra note 16; N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1985 at B9, col. 3; Treasury Puts Off 'Drop Dead
Day' to Nov. 15, 43 CONG. Q. 2148 (1985).
33. Representative Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) was made chairman of the task force that
examined the constitutional issues posed by the original Gramm-Rudman proposal; I
served on this task force.
34. See supra text accompanying note 24.
35. See Letter from the Honorable Jack Brooks to the Honorable Mike Synar (Oct.
25, 1985).
36. See Draft Amendment on Judicial Review (Oct. 19, 1985). Expedited judicial
review of the constitutionality of the bill was requested because, absent a swift review,
the courts would never have had the opportunity to consider the constitutional questions
raised by Gramm-Rudman. Since the budget process is an annual occurrence, the first
Gramm-Rudman cycle would have run before a final court decision would have been
handed down in the normal course of review.
As a result, the political process would have either adapted to Gramm-Rudman, or
fixed it. In either event, it would have been virtually impossible to unscramble the eggs
19871
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posed that we include a nonseverability clause which would have
forced a court to strike down the entire Gramm-Rudman Act if
the court found that any provision in the proposal was constitu-
tionally flawed.17 The purpose of the nonseverability provision
was to ensure that a reviewing court did not alter the legislation
in an undesirable manner by selectively declaring only certain
portions of the bill unconstitutional. Because support for an au-
tomatic budget-cutting mechanism was so strong, the task force
chose to retain the original Senate budget-cutting mechanism,
and recommend only those changes concerning expedited judi-
cial review and the nonseverability provision. The House confer-
ees included these recommendations in their informal proposal
to the Senate. The Senate conferees rejected the House proposal
and the first conference on Gramm-Rudman dissolved in
disagreement.
Because the debt-ceiling deadline continued to press on
Congress, the House immediately began reconsideration on the
House floor of the original Senate version of Gramm-Rudman.
8
This consideration took the form of an amendment in the nature
of a substitute, which became known as the "Democratic alter-
native."3' The trigger mechanism in this proposal consisted of
an estimate by CBO alone.4 In response to constitutional critics,
the Democratic alternative also contained provisions for expe-
dited judicial review and nonseverability." The House passed
this bill on a partisan vote with only three defections. 42
The Senate took up the debt-ceiling measure as amended
by the House and, after several days of debate and amendments,
approved a new version of Gramm-Rudman on November 6,
1985.43 As an amendment to the House Democratic alternative,
politically, and difficult for the courts to strike down Gramm-Rudman, given that at
least one and probably several federal budgets would have already been approved and
executed prior to a court's decision.
37. See Draft Amendment on Nonseverability (Oct. 19, 1985).
38. See 131 CONG. REc. H9575 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1985).
39. Id. at H9577.
40. Id. at H9582.
41. Id. at H9614.
42. Id. The Republican who voted with the Democrats was Rep. John Paul Ham-
merschmidt (R-Ark.). The Democrats who voted with the Republicans were Reps.
George Crockett (D-Mich.) and Paul Kanjorski (D-Pa.).
43. 131 CONG. REC. S14904-24 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985).
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the Senate agreed to include an expedited judicial review provi-
sion similar in concept to the one that I had previously proposed
and which was included in the bill passed by the House." This
was a significant amendment in that for the first time, both
Houses had approved a judicial review provision. Thus, it was
certain that if the bill were enacted into law, its constitutionality
could be tested without undue delay.The Senate version differed
from the House Democratic alternative in two significant ways.
First, the Senate proposal amended the original Gramm-Rud-
man trigger mechanism which called for the GAO to develop its
own estimate of the annual federal budget deficit, basing their
determination on similar estimates by the CBO and the OMB."
At the time, it was believed that the inclusion of GAO in the
trigger mechanism would alleviate the constitutional concerns
that had been raised in various analyses of the bill's constitu-
tionality."' Congress ultimately adopted this proposal as a suita-
ble compromise. 47
Second, the Senate rejected the provision in the House
Democratic alternative with regard to nonseverability.4 a In its
49place, the Senate proposed the so-called "fallback" provision.
This section provided that if a court were to find any portion of
the trigger mechanism unconstitutional, the trigger mechanism
would be replaced with a process whereby an affirmative vote by
the Congress and presentment to the President would be neces-
sary before automatic budget cuts could take place.0
Once again, due to differences between the bills, the Senate
asked for a conference committee to resolve the disparities. On
November 6, the House appointed conferees 51 and on November
7, the Senate did the same.52 The second conference committee
convened on November 10, 1985.
Because the President was soon to leave for a summit meet-
44. See id. at H9843, S14910 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985).
45. Id. at H9838, S14908.
46. Id. at S14911 (statement of Sen. Gramm (R-Tex.)).
47. See infra notes 55, 56 and accompanying text.
48. 131 CONG. REC. H9843, S14910 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985).
49. Id. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-177, § 274(f), 99 Stat. 1037, 1100 (1985).
50. Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(f), 99 Stat. 1037, 1100 (1985).
51. 131 CONG. REc. H9868 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985).
52. Id. at S15042 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1985).
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ing in Geneva and the Treasury was on the threshold of techni-
cal default, Congress, on November 14, 1985, approved a short-
term debt-ceiling extension that would authorize the Treasury
to borrow funds sufficient to meet all obligations until approxi-
mately December 12, 1985.11 Fortunately, the conference com-
mittee was able to resolve the differences between the two ver-
sions of the bill before this deadline was reached, but only just
barely. With regard to the constitutional issues raised by
Gramm-Rudman's trigger mechanism, the House conferees es-
sentially agreed to the Senate proposal in which the GAO would
estimate the trigger. As to judicial review, the Senate conferees
also agreed to the House provision. The final conference agree-
ment was silent on the issue of nonseverability; however, it did
include the Senate's fallback provision, thereby implying to a re-
viewing court that the trigger mechanism was severable from the
rest of the bill.
Thus, the final conference compromise on the constitutional
questions regarding Gramm-Rudman's trigger mechanism in-
volved the following three aspects: 1) a trigger budget deficit es-
timate by GAO that would be based upon similar previous esti-
mates by both CBO and OMB; 2) an expedited judicial review
process for determining the statute's constitutionality before the
budget-cutting mechanism was fully implemented; and 3) a
fallback provision in the event a reviewing court should deter-
mine that any portion of the trigger mechanism was
unconstitutional.5 4
Congress finally enacted Gramm-Rudman on December 11,
1985. 55 President Reagan signed the Act into law shortly thereaf-
ter on December 12, 1985." Still concerned that the new law was
an unconstitutional delegation of the congressional spending
power, I filed suit two hours later in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia challenging the new law's
constitutionality and seeking an injunction on its
implementation. 57
53. Id. at H10196 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1985).
54. See id. at H11684 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985).
55. Id. at H11875, 903 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985).
56. See Statement on Signing H.J. Res. 372 Into Law, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1490-91 (Dec. 12, 1985).
57. See Complaint, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (No. 85-
[Vol. 7:675
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II. The Court Challenge
A. The Standing Issue
During the congressional debate on Gramm-Rudman, it had
become increasingly apparent that Congress was determined to
delegate its spending powers unconstitutionally. Consequently, I
became convinced that a court challenge to the law was the only
way to avoid an abrogation of the Constitution.' It was for this
reason that I worked to include the expedited judicial review
provision in the final version of the Act." Expedition of the re-
view cycle was crucial to avoid executing a full Gramm-Rudman
budget-cutting cycle prior to a final decision as to the constitu-
tionality of that process.6
In conjunction with the question of expediting the review
process, another troublesome question arose with regard to judi-
cial review - standing. Would we be able to show sufficient in-
jury-in-fact to support judicial action before automatic cuts were
made? As with the question of expedition, we considered a stat-
utory amendment granting us anticipatory standing. Such an
amendment raised constitutional questions of its own. Although
Congress clearly has the authority to waive judicial standing
doctrines such as ripeness, mootness, and perhaps, political
question, we were doubtful that amending the legislation to
grant us standing prior to implementation of Gramm-Rudman
cuts would, in and of itself, satisfy the article III standing re-
3945), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). On Dec. 19, 1985, eleven
other Representatives added their names as plaintiffs in the case. See Amended Com-
plaint, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub non. Bowsher v.
Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (adding Reps. Gary L. Ackerman (D-N.Y.), Albert G. Bus-
temante (D-Tex.), Silvio 0. Conte (R-Mass.), Don Edwards (D-Cal.), Vic Fazio (D-Cal.),
Robert Garcia (D-N.Y.), John J. LaFalce (D-N.Y.), Jim Moody (D-Wis.), Claude Pepper
(D-Fla.), Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.), James A. Traficant, Jr. (D-Ohio) as plaintiffs in
case).
58. As suggested by Professor Tribe:
Every lawmaker's oath to uphold the Constitution imposes a duty to consider the
constitutionality of Gramm-Rudman before voting on it. See U.S. Const.,
Art.VI .... Thus Congress cannot responsibly enact Gramm-Rudman without ex-
pressly providing for an immediate judicial test of the bill's validity through a civil
suit brought by affected Members of Congress.
Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, supra note 26.
59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 36.
19871
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quirement. 1 I came to realize that to fulfill the standing require-
ment for purposes of a judicial challenge to Gramm-Rudman,
more than a simple amendment to the legislation would be
required.2
After considerable research, a draft amendment' 3 was pre-
pared which provided for an expedited review and attempted to
cure the problem of standing. The draft language providing for
anticipatory judicial review was nearly identical to the language
that was ultimately enacted into law on December 12, 1985.6"
With the standing question resolved as well as possible under
the circumstances, we proceeded to file our complaint challeng-
ing Gramm-Rudman's constitutionality immediately after the
President signed the bill into law.
B. The District Court Proceedings
In our complaint, we alleged that the automatic deficit-re-
duction process was unconstitutional in two respects6 5 First,
and most importantly, we alleged that congressional delegation
of control over the spending power to the Comptroller General
constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 66
In addition, we alleged that the powers delegated to the GAO
and the CBO - both of which we deemed to be legislative
rather than executive agencies - could only be constitutionally
61. See U.S. CONST. art. III. The district court's analysis of the standing issue subse-
quently confirmed our concerns in this regard. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
1374, 1380-82 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). Inter-
preting Supreme Court decisions, the district court observed:
[T]he Court has repeatedly recognized that the concept [of art. III standing] en-
tails certain basic requirements. . . . [A] party must allege a "distinct and palpa-
ble injury to himself." ... This injury must be a "particular concrete injury" . ..
which must amount to "a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm." . . . "[Alt an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the
party who invokes the court's authority to [show] ... that the injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be a favorable decision.'"
Id. at 1379-90 (citations omitted).
62. See infra text accompanying note 68.
63. Draft Amendment on Judicial Review (Oct. 19, 1985) (copy on file at Pace Law
Review).
64. Compare Draft Amendment on Judicial Review (Oct. 19, 1985) with Pub. L. No.
99-177, Title II, § 274(a)(1), 99 Stat. 1037, 1098 (1985).
65. See Complaint, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (No. 85-
3945), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
66. Id.
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assigned to executive branch officials. 7
We sought to fulfill the standing requirement of actual in-
jury-in-fact by alleging in our complaint that the Gramm-Rud-
man Act: 1) interfered with our constitutional duties to enact
laws regarding federal spending; 2) impaired our ability to per-
form our duties by requiring automatic reductions in our sala-
ries, the salaries of our staff, and our office budgets; and 3) in-
jured our constituents by causing automatic reductions in a
variety of programs that benefitted them. 8 We asked the court
to declare that the automatic deficit-reduction process was un-
constitutional and therefore, the President was without power to
order spending reductions pursuant to the Gramm-Rudman
Act."9 We also asked the court, upon striking down Gramm-Rud-
man's automatic budget-cutting mechanism, to declare that the
fallback provision contained in the Act would govern the
Gramm-Rudman budget process. 0
The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)71 filed a
similar complaint shortly thereafter.72 The NTEU sought stand-
ing to sue on the ground that its retired members had been in-
jured by the Act's automatic spending provisions, which had al-
ready operated to suspend cost-of-living adjustments that had
been due to federal retirees on January 1, 1986 .7 The two ac-
tions were consolidated on January 2, 1986.7
Several other parties intervened in the suit to oppose our
position. The Senate and the Comptroller General of the GAO
both were granted leave to intervene as defendants shortly after
our suit against the United States was filed.75 Subsequently, the
Speaker and the Bipartisan Leadership Group of the United
67. Id.
68. Id. See also Affidavit of Rep. Mike Synar, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
1374 (D.D.C.) (No. 85-3945), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
69. See Complaint, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374.
70. Id.
71. The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) is an unincorporated associa-
tion which represents the interests of both active and retired federal employees. Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (D.D.C.) aff'd sub norn. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.
Ct. 3181 (1986).
72. See Complaint, National Treasury Employee Union v. United States, 626 F.
Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
73. Id.
74. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1378.
75. See id. at 1378-79.
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States House of Representatives were also granted leave to in-
tervene as defendants in the action."'
We encountered our first hurdle in the suit on December 30,
1985, when the United States filed a motion to dismiss our ac-
tion on the ground that we had no standing to sue." The other
defendants joined in this motion. 8 In essence, the defendants
argued that as Members of Congress, we had no more standing
to sue than any other citizen because our injury was nothing
more than a generalized grievance shared by all other citizens.7 9
They argued that we would not be injured to the extent required
by the Constitution for standing until automatic budget cuts ac-
tually had occurred.8
The three-judge district court panel subsequently rejected
the defendants' standing arguments.' 1 Noting that the judicial
review provisions contained in section 274 of the Act expanded
our standing to sue "to the full extent permitted by Article III,"
the court disregarded any of the so-called "prudential" limita-
tions on standing.'2 The court held that as Members of Con-
gress, we had a personal interest in the exercise of governmental
powers. Gramm-Rudman would usurp these powers and suffi-
ciently injure this interest to confer standing.' 3 Thus, the court
found that we had been and would continue to be injured by the
automatic deficit-reduction process because it interfered with
our constitutional duty to enact laws regarding federal
spending."
76. Id.
77. See Motion to Dismiss at 18, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374.
78. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
79. See Motion to Dismiss at 18, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374. The
defendants did not contest NTEU's standing to challenge Gramm-Rudman's constitu-
tionality. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1379.
80. See Motion to Dismiss at 19, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374. For a
discussion of constitutional standing requirements, see supra note 61.
81. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1379-82.
82. "Prudential" limitations on standing are limitations on standing which are not
strictly required by article III, such as the requirement that the plaintiff be within the
"zone of interests" protected by the statutory provision on which he relies. Id. at 1380
n.3.
83. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1382.
84. Id. ("[Tihe Act unconstitutionally gives to the Comptroller General and the
President formal power to amend or repeal appropriations legislation that was lawfully
passed, and thus effectively to nullify plaintiffs' votes on that earlier legislation.").
[Vol. 7:675
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/6
CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE
After disposing of the standing issue, the court considered
the merits of our case. Noting that it was "strictly" unnecessary
to do so, the court first addressed our arguments with regard to
the issue of delegation.8" In our memorandum in support of our
motion for summary judgment, we argued that the delegation of
spending authority to the GAO under Gramm-Rudman was un-
constitutional for several reasons. Primarily, the spending power
was a core function of the legislature, and therefore, Congress
could not delegate that power to another body.8" We argued that
such delegation under Gramm-Rudman was excessive and un-
constitutional. We also argued that Gramm-Rudman gave the
GAO the authority to nullify past and future legislation based
solely on an administrative determination; therefore, the Act
constituted an undue delegation of the congressional power to
legislate.8 7 In support of our contentions, we asserted that a
broad delegation such as this must be supported by some rigor-
ous principle of necessity which was not present in this instance
because the GAO could provide no more expertise on the issue
of deficit spending than Congress itself.88 Finally, we argued that
Gramm-Rudman constituted an undue delegation of congres-
sional power because it failed to provide sufficient standards to
confine the exercise of administrative discretion and to provide
for judicial review. 89 The district court panel rejected each of
these arguments in turn,90 preferring instead to strike down the
85. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1382-83. The court explicitly described
its findings regarding the delegation doctrine as obiter dicta. Id. Thus, there is no bind-
ing precedent on the issue of unconstitutional delegation in the context of Gramm-Rud-
man. This will be significant should proponents of new Gramm-Rudman legislation suc-
ceed in enacting such legislation and a new constitutional challenge is mounted.
86. See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
20-21, Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374.
87. Id. at 21-22.
88. Id. at 27-31.
89. Id. at 32-34.
90. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1382-91. The district court rejected
the "core function" argument noting plaintiff's failure to cite a case in which the Su-
preme Court has held any legislative power to be nondelegable due to its "core function"
status. The court held that judicial adoption of a "core function" analysis would be "ef-
fectively standardless" as no constitutional provision distinguishes between "core" and
"non core" legislative functions. Lastly, the court determined that if indeed there were
any nondelegable "core functions," there was no reason to include appropriations func-
tions among them. Id. at 1385.
Rejecting the argument that the power to be allocated to administrative officials was
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Act on the ground that it conferred upon the Comptroller Gen-
eral powers which are executive in nature and therefore violated
the doctrine of separation of powers."e
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The defendant-intervenors appealed this decision to the
United States Supreme Court,9s arguing that the three-judge
panel misconstrued the Constitution as requiring that the duties
assigned to the Comptroller General under the Act may be per-
formed only by an officer serving at the President's pleasure.9 3
On appeal, we argued not only that the district court was correct
as to separation of powers, but also that the district court had
erred in holding that the Act did not unconstitutionally delegate
congressional powers to the GAO.
On July 7, 1986, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's judgment. 4 The Court did not consider the question of
whether we, as congressional plaintiffs, had standing to bring the
action. Instead, the Court found standing to exist on the part of
the sole NTEU member who had subsequently become a party
to the suit."' On the merits, the Court held that the district
court had correctly found that Gramm-Rudman violated the
unconstitutionally excessive, the court noted that the delegation of similar broad author-
ity has been upheld in past cases. The court also rejected the argument that a broad
delegation of power such as this must be supported by some rigorous principle of neces-
sity. The court acknowledged that in some delegation cases, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the necessity for the delegation, but this necessity refers only to "a strong utility
and convenience" which the court found to certainly exist in this case. While necessity
has been considered by the Supreme Court in upholding a delegation, lack of necessity
has never been invoked to strike one down. Id. at 1386.
Lastly, the court considered the principal argument that because of the lack of stan-
dards and inherent imprecision of the duties conferred upon the administrators, the Act
fails adequately to confine the exercise of administrative discretion. In this regard, the
court held that the "totality of the Act's standards, definitions, context, and reference to
past administrative practice provides an adequate 'intelligible principle' to guide and
confine administrative decisionmaking." Id. at 1389.
91. Id. at 1391-1404.
92. Pursuant to § 274(b) of the Act, the appeal was taken directly to the United
States Supreme Court. Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, § 274(b), 99 Stat. 1037, 1098-99 (1985).
93. Brief for Appellant at 12, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (Nos. 85-
1377, 85-1378, 85-1379).
94. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3194 (1986).
95. Id. at 3186 ("It is clear that members of the Union, one of whom is an appellee
here, will sustain injury by not receiving a scheduled increase in benefits.").
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doctrine of separation of powers by investing executive powers
in the GAO, a body that was under congressional control."6 Af-
firming the district court decision on this ground, the Court
found it unnecessary to consider any of our arguments with re-
gard to the delegation doctrine.9 7 By focusing so narrowly on the
separation of powers issue, the Court left open the possibility
that future congresses would attempt to "fix" Gramm-Rudman's
constitutional problems by finding a new method for triggering
automatic budget cuts that would not violate the principle of
separation of powers. Recent developments indicate that this is
precisely what Gramm-Rudman proponents propose to do."
III. Prospects
Will Congress ever reduce the deficit now that the auto-
matic trigger mechanism of Gramm-Rudman is gone? Some ar-
gue that Congress is too susceptible to pressure from special in-
terest groups which advocate various spending programs. They
seem to contend that short of a constitutional amendment to
balance the budget, a line-item veto for the President, or some
other gimmick, Congress will not act until disaster strikes the
United States economy.
I do not agree with this view. The Founding Fathers built in
a "check" on congressional activities - spending as well as
others; that check is the ballot box. The Congress is responsive
to the American people, but constituent pressure on members
has not yet been strong enough to force a balanced budget. Pres-
sure on Congress has been strong enough, however, to force sub-
stantial changes in congressional habits - changes in the direc-
tion of fiscal responsibility.9 Although these changes have been
96. Id. at 3186-92.
97. Id. at 3193 n.10.
98. At this writing, Senator Gramm is expected to offer an amendment to pending
debt ceiling legislation which would give the authority for drafting sequestration orders
to the Office of Management and Budget, an executive branch agency. In the House,
Majority Leader Tom Foley is expected to propose that the President be given the op-
tion of signing sequestration orders prepared by the Comptroller General. Neither of
these proposals attempts to resolve any delegation problems that existed with the origi-
nal statute, and the Foley proposal arguably does not cure the problem of separation of
powers.
99. More than half of the members of the 100th Congress were first elected with me
in 1978 or since. The so-called "big spending" liberals are a thing of the past. Thus,
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significant, they are not yet sufficient to resolve the problem of
the growing federal deficit.
There are two key reasons why the ballot box system has
not yet caused Congress to reduce the deficit. First, the problem
has not yet become a pocketbook issue. In many parts of the
country, the local economy has remained healthy despite the
buildup of huge budget deficits. Consequently, voters have not
focused on this abstract economic problem. In areas of the
United States where the economy has not been good (e.g., the oil
and gas producing states in the Southwest or the rural areas in
the Southeast where textiles and agriculture dominate local
economies), the voters have been able to attribute the blame for
their economic maladies on specific, external causes such as
OPEC, increased textile imports, and the national farm policy,
rather than on federal budget deficits.
Second, rather than recognizing the reality that we must af-
firmatively address the problem, President Reagan has con-
vinced many voters that it is possible for the economy to "grow
out" of budget deficits. In addition, the President has effectively
removed himself from the budget process by sending to the Hill
each year a budget which is immediately described by members
of both parties as "dead on arrival." 100 Without the President's
involvement, and worse, with the President promising economic
recovery despite twelve-figure deficits, Congress alone cannot re-
duce the deficit to a manageable level.
My experience with Gramm-Rudman has taught me that we
cannot legislate leadership. Gramm-Rudman was an attempt to
insulate Congress from tough political decisions, thus removing
accountability from the shoulders of Congress. Through this leg-
islation, unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats would have been
empowered to cut the federal budget. The bottom-line issue in
congressional action on proposals providing new spending authority is rare and when
Congress does consider such proposals, it is generally careful to identify either new reve-
nues to fund such programs or offsetting budget cuts. A liberal Member of Congress
from Philadelphia was elected Chairman of the House Budget Committee in 1984, and
the first two budgets in his tenure as Chairman produced deficits less than the budgets
approved by the Republican-controlled Senate. The dominant economic issue of the 1984
presidential election, and the first proposal made by the new House Speaker in 1987
upon his election, both concerned the need for new taxes to reduce the deficit.
100. In fact, the "dead on arrival" characterization has become so common that the
OMB staff recently delivered the budget to Congress dressed in surgical garb.
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the whole Gramm-Rudman debate was accountability.
The Supreme Court struck down the automatic Gramm-
Rudman trigger on separation of powers grounds. I believe, how-
ever, that the true problem with Gramm-Rudman is the delega-
tion of powers. Despite the Court's rejection of our delegation
argument, the lower court did look favorably upon our assess-
ment of the problem:
We observe, moreover, that although we have rejected the ar-
gument based upon the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation,
the more technical separation-of-powers requirements we have re-
lied upon may serve to further the policy of that doctrine more
effectively than the doctrine itself. Unconstitutional delegation
has been invoked by the federal courts to invalidate legislation
only twice in almost 200 years, and the possibility of such invali-
dation, at least in modern times, is not a credible deterrent
against the human propensity to leave difficult questions to some-
body else. The instances are probably innumerable, however, in
which Congress has chosen to decide a difficult issue itself be-
cause of its reluctance to leave the decision - as our holding to-
day reaffirms it must - to an officer within the control of the
executive branch. 10 1
Clearly, Gramm-Rudman was an attempt "to leave difficult
questions to somebody else." The structure of our government,
as established by the Constitution, serves as both a practical and
legal limit on Congress' ability to delegate powers. The Constitu-
tion demands that powers be delegated in a certain way, but
even within the constitutionally permissible range of delegation,
Congress can allow itself to go only so far. The political balance
supports the constitutional balance.
Currently, there is discussion in the House of Representa-
tives of possible amendments to Gramm-Rudman which would
"cure" its constitutional deficiencies. Such a cure would require
that the trigger mechanism be outside congressional control.
While I would hope to avoid another challenge in the courts, I
will oppose such legislation. Congress should abandon gimmicks
and begin making the tough decisions. Since Congress reflects its
constituents, the threshold task before us is to convince the
101. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1404 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bow-
sher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
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American people that federal budget deficits are a real and
threatening economic danger. This is a political task which puts
Congress in direct conflict with the President's current economic
program.
Our system of government is a dynamic system that ebbs
and flows with changing politics. To work, it requires that Con-
gress be accountable for its actions and responsive to the views
of the American people. Whether Gramm-Rudman represents an
unconstitutional delegation of powers or whether it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers, Gramm-Rudman is still wrong.
With that, Congress must do its job.
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